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  Unrealism: critical reflections in popular genre 
 
 
 
Worldweave 
The fact of the Weird is the fact that the worldweave is ripped and unfinished. Moth-
eaten, ill-made. And that through the little tears, from behind the ragged  
     edges 
, things are looking at us. (Miéville 2011, 1115) 
Weird fiction is distinguished by its evocations of horror and through its technical differences 
from other popular genres. Yet it remains, in the generic differences it articulates, connected 
to other modes of fiction and, in its production of horrifying effects, at odds with familiar 
realities. The composite “worldweave” serves as a reminder that the web of words, things, 
feelings, customs and institutions constituting reality is neither as secure nor as unified as 
practical realism would have it. Weird fiction’s horror exposes holes in the representation and 
fabric of everyday existence: it is neither “holy” nor whole but “hole-y” (Miéville 2011, 
1115). Through tears in life’s fabric, it imagines further horrors in the object-gaze of “that a-
human(ist) totality that once seen can’t be unseen” (Noys and Murphy 2016, 200). Horror 
shreds sense, order and meaning, slashing the threads coordinating self, other, object, reality 
and reason. The image of the worldweave, moreover, illuminates other generic forms and 
effects. The uncanny, for instance, as a staple effect of gothic anxieties and fantastic 
hesitations, registers breaches in the fabric of things: in gothic fiction reality-testing is briefly 
disarrayed by irruptions of strange energies; in fantasy, tears enable departures from orders of 
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probability and rationality. While gothic gently recoils, resetting its self against tremors of 
haunting and hallucination, forms of fantasy find opportunities in the torn fabric, gaps 
permitting passage to other worlds and dimensions. 
“Unrealism”, marked by negativity, interruption and discontinuity, registers tears in the fabric 
of generic and social realities. Neither a genre in itself nor a genre-specific property, it 
discloses – amid fictional genres (such as romance, horror or fantasy) considered inimical to 
protocols of realism and naturalised habits of reality – an insubordinate disposition towards 
discrete and distinct forms. It acknowledges the interdependence of generic differentiations 
(including realism) as part of a tense and open system of classification and, further, interferes 
with cultural constructions of reality. From interrogations of aesthetic hierarchies and 
evaluations, to disturbances in the patterns of composition, expectation and reception 
prescribed by genre, unrealism probes the gaps and absences occluded by modes of 
representation whose power and effect depends upon claims of secure and unified reality. 
Rereading fantastic fiction as a subversive mode that (contra Todorovian structuralism) 
engages social and historical reserves, Rosemary Jackson notes how its “unreality” 
differentially interrogates the security of categories of the real and the unified, nostalgic 
visions of totalising, moral and hierarchical forms of fantasy (she cites C S Lewis and  J R R 
Tolkien as examples) (1981, 2). Distinguishing differential relations of representation, 
Jackson’s argument draws on the “negative subjunctivity” with which Joanna Russ elaborates 
fantasy’s refusal and violation of the rules of reality (1995, 15-26). Inverting negative 
relations and activating negations in reciprocal differentiations of fiction and reality, the “un” 
of “unrealism” condenses negativities of generic and cultural subordination and discloses 
their ungrounded and incomplete structures of articulation. Unrealism’s negations are not, 
however, resolved in a single political view or unified position. Suspicious of the rules 
informing composition and expectation, especially those prescribing a single or immersive 
3 
 
perspective, unrealism also eschews occlusions of representational artifice undertaken in the 
interests of establishing authority on the basis of naturalised reality. Instead, prompting 
critical, interrogative reading, unrealism employs techniques of reflexivity, juxtaposition, 
discontinuity and interruption. Describing his use of “portal fantasies”, M John Harrison 
admits a significant departure from standard practice: access to fantasy’s “imaginary country” 
is blocked (Bould 2005, 329). Immersion is interrupted in line with other techniques of 
discontinuity (Varn and Ragahendra 2016, np). These strategies form part of a wider critique 
of the “fantasy culture” purveyed by neoliberalism and consumerism (Mathew 2002, np). 
Fantasy – fictional and real – is interrogated in other modes. The playful narrative 
juxtapositions of Alasdair Gray’s Poor Things (1992), for example, opposes generic 
Victorian gothic fantasy (as the gloomy material instantiation and occlusion of commodity 
culture across a reality of industrial exploitation) to a more sympathetic and historically 
credible socialist realism. But, via a preliminary frame using a postmodernised discovered 
manuscript trope, the novel refuses established political opposition in a textual reflection that 
further entangles and interrogates relations between, and veracities of, fictional and historical 
discourse. Drawing attention to, rather than occluding, artifices of aesthetic and political 
representation, the reflexivity of the text invites active critical reading.  
Unrealism, then, can be distinguished as a writerly mode of narrative interruption that 
appears in and across popular forms of fiction often categorised as ‘unrealistic’. As 
reflections on genre in genre fiction, moments of unrealism draw attention to the conventions 
and expectations through which generic boundaries and differences are maintained. Shifting 
focus and register from plot to form, moreover, has the effect of unsettling habituated patterns 
of reading and, beyond a particular text, engendering disturbances that trouble the work of 
genre criticism and challenge the assumptions securing wider (ideological) delineations of 
fiction and reality. More than the subordinated antithesis of realism, unrealism, in the 
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argument that follows, is seen to precipitate a wider interrogation of the framing of and the 
instability between social, aesthetic and political differentiations of fiction, reality and 
fantasy: deployments of the prefix in Jacques Rancière’s political-aesthetic theory and in 
Sigmund Freud’s notions of the unconscious and the uncanny, disclose an extensive and 
disarming disruption of the underpinnings of social and subjective senses of ‘reality’. Similar 
disruptions manifest themselves in reflections on genre, fiction and reality in writings by M 
John Harrison, J G Ballard and China Miéville, offering a space to interrogate the naturalised 
assumptions of political and social existences suffused by media, commerce, and fantasy. As 
a mode that challenges unified perspectives, however, unrealism is not tied to pre-established 
positions: though politically indeterminate, Kazuo Ishiguro’s literary dystopia remorselessly 
disarms any single interpretative framework, whether historical, social or realistic. 
 
Surf Noir 
In Nova Swing (2006), the second of M John Harrison’s Light trilogy, there is a curious and 
resonant reflection on an innocuous scene in a quiet bar. A disenchanted detective, taking 
time to review his ongoing investigation and smoke a pipe, watches a child play on the sandy 
floor between cane chairs and tables. The youngster is dressed only in a t-shirt with “SURF 
NOIR” printed on it. The reference, quite likely alluding to the bar (“Café Surf”), prompts 
wider speculation:  
Meanings – all incongruous – splashed off this like drops of water, as the dead 
metaphors trapped inside the live one collided and reverberated endlessly and 
elastically, taking up new positions relative to one another. SURF NOIR, which is a 
whole new existence; which is a “world” implied in two words, dispelled in an 
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instant; which is foam on the appalling multitextual sea we drift on. “Which is 
probably”, Aschemann noted, “the name of an aftershave”. (2006, 27-8) 
Collisions of connotation and association situate the detective’s speculations in a thoroughly 
postmodern and poststructuralist frame wherein dehiscence from systems of meaning is seen 
as reflexive froth and marketing fantasies. Though consonant with other themes of the novel 
– the unfixing of meaning linked to quantum rewritings of the universe and the epochal 
rupture of economic and financial deregulation – it is anachronistic: recognisably late 
twentieth-century reflections occur on a distant planet four hundred years in the future. 
Protagonist and setting (a non-corporate commercial-criminal zone of sleazy entertainments 
and biotechnological experimentation echoing the “Sprawl” of William Gibson’s 
Neuromancer [1984]) imply a near-future cyber-hardboiled social commentary, even though, 
in grander SF terms, the planet has been constructed by advanced alien species to observe and 
exploit a massive singularity. The ring of moved or manufactured planets is nicknamed “the 
Beach” and the singularity’s radiation is described as surf, adding to reflexive density. 
Simultaneously specific and vague, the references – like the club “Tech Noir” named in 
James Cameron’s 1984 movie The Terminator – compose an act of self-en-genre-ing: “Surf 
Noir” constitutes both a reflection in fiction on genre and names itself anew in generic terms. 
The elision of retro-topical consideration of genres and settings and retro-tropical concerns 
with commercial image-making and simulation draws out the extent of the hyper-realities 
interrogated in Harrison’s fiction: in a context of immersion tanks, sentient tattoos and 
quantum disruptions, questions of that most moveable of feasts called “reality” recur. In the 
first book of the trilogy, the career path of two local underworld bosses (the “Cray sisters”) is 
plotted as a move from “digitised art retroporn” to various larger criminal schemes. The 
former, however, inscribes a thoroughly aesthetic perspective on genres of sexual 
commodification: the Crays specialised in producing “a surface so realistic it seemed to 
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defamiliarise the sex act into something machine-like and interesting” (2002, 16). The 
recollection of the erotic-technological collisions of JG Ballard is not accidental since 
Harrison worked for New Worlds (Latham 2005). But formalist self-awareness reframes that 
commentary on media-technological visions from the 1970s as a matter of technique 
combining generic repetition and aesthetic commodification in the remaking of credible and 
desirable realities.  
Reflections on form and genre continue. In Nova Swing, one popular source entertainment is 
found in spectacular boxing tournaments involving magnificent and fabulously real 
protagonists called “cultivars”. As their name suggests they have little relation to any natural 
reality. They are feats of genetic engineering designed to realise the most striking 
combinations of an imaginary bestiary: “the cultivars all strutting about, all tusks and tattoos, 
their erect cocks the size of horses’, the sudden flash of an eight-inch spur, then something 
slick and ropey levered out and steaming in the shadows” (2006, 84). Marvels of bioscience, 
they seem to confirm the teratological horrors predicted in Paul Virilio’s discussions of 
transgenic arts in Art and Fear (2000): the thrill-bound death-risk of extreme sports, callously 
combined with aesthetic hybridisation and realised by technobiology, produces any artificial 
and monstrous form just because it can (Virilio 2000, 59-61). With cultivars, though quite as 
fabulous in their actuality, no horror is registered, nor any of the social indictment associated 
with gladiatorial scenes like those in China Miéville’s Perdido Street Station (2000) where 
humans are fatally pitted against crude human-machine hybrids and human-insect beings. 
Pleasures for the privileged and powerful, they crystallize the inequities and brutal penal 
technologies that prop up vicious social injustice (Miéville 2000, 207). 
Evoking neither moral horror, nor political revulsion, nor, indeed, much wonder, the cultivar 
fights in Nova Swing are underwhelming: “despite their vitality – which streamed out of the 
air like the life force you would expect of a horse – the fighters were less than real, an in-the-
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end pointless looping of their personal dreams into parity with some sort of public idea of 
what a fighter ought to resemble” (2006, 97). Found wanting because nothing is lacking in 
these fabulous realisations, their hyperreality is situated in a closed circuit of expectation and 
actualisation. Perfectly realised, these fabulous forms remain unrealistic because they are too 
complete: fully capturing reality without realism (or vice versa?), they have nothing of the 
excess or incompletion that anchors a sense of reality. In generic terms, too, formulaic 
reiterations only lead to habituation and banality. With cultivars (despite visibly throbbing 
with vital difference), idea and expectation are too congruent: little unpredictability remains 
to invigorate a strong enough sense of difference to break the event horizon of sameness: 
“you can claim, and people do, that every fight is different: but it is a difference that works 
itself out within sameness, so that when you have seen one fight you have truly seen them 
all” (2006, 94). A paradox of genre appears: perfect form obliterates the hierarchical or serial 
differences on which it depends. Reflections on generic form – in texts employing the very 
same form – are not unusual in popular fiction. Eighteenth-century romances, those of Ann 
Radcliffe notably, abounded with discussions and examples of the dangers of romance 
reading, sensitive to both didactic and critical concerns. Interplays of fiction and reality 
staged within romance fiction, of course, can engender the opposite effect: rather than 
returning romance to social reality, it can further destabilise distinctions, as in Edgar Allan 
Poe’s “The Fall of the House of Usher” (1839) in which the reading of a supernatural 
romance in a romance compounds its hallucinatory and disturbing ripples.  
Matters become more complicated in contexts where the contours of reality are permeated by 
multiple and rapidly circulating media platforms. The “consensual hallucination” of 
cyberspace, for instance, renders borders between fiction, fantasy, reality, realism and 
ideology increasingly fluid (Gibson 1984, 12). But technological developments of post-war 
culture had already, as JG Ballard noted in his preface to Crash (first drafted for the French 
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edition of 1974 and rewritten in 1995), instantiated a major shift: the coupling of reason and 
nightmare accompanying a world of sexual freedoms and sated desire, of new technologies, 
communications and markets, telescopes a narrative of historical linearity so that the future 
collapses on the present and reverses priorities: 
We live in a world ruled by fictions of every kind – mass-merchandizing, advertising, 
politics conducted as a branch of advertising, the pre-emptying of any original 
response to experience by the television screen. We live inside an enormous novel. It 
is less and less necessary for the writer to invent the fictional content of his novel. The 
fiction is already there. The writer’s task is to invent the reality. (Ballard 1995, xviii) 
Given the extent of reversals, it is possible to draw nostalgic conclusions from Ballard’s 
claim and seek a return to a reality grounded in fewer technological or media supplements. 
But Ballard’s account proposes further reversals: reality is no longer to be sought in an 
external world (that is already the big fiction) but may be detected in smaller, residual form, 
in an inner domain of fantasy and imagination, “inside our own heads”. Even the diminution 
and relocation of reality as a private, interior and imaginative space barely distinguished from 
hallucination or madness becomes problematic in the terms set by his novel: reality is to be 
invented. To follow the reading advocated by Jean Baudrillard, the novel already fully 
manifests the instantiation of a hyperhomogenized realm of simulations, thereby transcoding 
distinctions of fiction and reality within a new frame: “in Crash, no more fiction or reality, 
hyperreality abolishes both” (Baudrillard 1994, 60). Any sense of reality (as in his discussion 
of Disneyland’s relation to “real” America) becomes a by-product of simulation (Baudrillard 
1994, 13). The perversely visionary aspect of Crash accommodates itself to ecstasies of 
simulation in an imminent future: the narrator (“James Ballard”) reflects on “being killed 
within this huge accumulation of fictions, finding my body marked with the imprint of a 
hundred television crime serials” (Ballard 1995, 60). Interchangeable and pervasive, the 
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films, photos, fictions, screens, celebrities, cars and communication systems, place the 
novel’s cult of techno-erotic visionaries on the cusp of a global media absorption. The focus 
on the wounds, scars, sexual encounters and crashes that – erotically and ecstatically – 
irreversibly imprint bodies with technology and reconfigure interpersonal relations and 
perceptions of lived reality through rejuvenating shocks: crashing is an event of both impact 
and imminence, an event that has already happened and is still to come, charged with all the 
intensities of the real as encounter, trauma, shock. The real is less an effect of representation 
(as banal in its circulations as a traffic jam on the Westway) and more an experience of 
unpredictable and powerful disruption.  
Hyperreality has already become an impoverished trope. A recent account of a speculative 
novel that is both “realist” and based on an impossible, unreal object (Mark Z. Danielewski’s 
House of Leaves, 2000) argues that it does not endorse the “tired postmodern agonies bound 
up with the figure of simulation” (Hansen 2004, 601). Something more disturbing and more 
banal occurs: it replays the trappings of material – printed, typographical – reality while 
engaging with the implications of a fully mediated, digital world, thereby confronting the 
“epistemological hurdles” and “ontological indifference” that succeeds simulation: 
mediations, multiple, irreferential, have become “so ubiquitous” as “simply to be reality”. 
Such a reality, however, is no longer maintained orthographically, not even residually tied to 
the recording of an event that has happened: digital mediation, extending Ballard’s grand 
fiction, marks “the wholesale substitution of the productive imagination for the registration of 
the real – the triumph of fiction over documentation” (Hansen 2004, 610). Reality – in a 
different mode – remains not as capture, representation, reference or registration of now 
evacuated external or objective worlds but as “projection”: the interplay of mediated, 
interpretative layers prompts “reality affects”. Realism, entwined and evoked in media 
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interrelations, patterns, recognitions and projection, is more a matter of matching than capture 
or recapture, of imagination and perspective rather than objective record.  
 
Something of the ‘Un’ 
Reality affects overlay reality effects. Fredric Jameson, indeed, reads the latter in terms of 
affect and intensity (2013, 36). For Roland Barthes, the “reality effect” is evoked through the 
“insignificant notation” rendered by details superfluous to overall interpretation: useless, it is 
their resistance to meaning that serves to “denote what is ordinarily called ‘concrete reality’” 
(Barthes 1986, 142). Sacrifices of meaning close off discursive horizons and anchor a “self-
sufficient” reality through effect and absence (invoking a real that has been) or affect and 
presence (evoking a palpable, immediate feeling). Jacques Rancière elaborates on the 
function of excess and absence in Barthes’ reality effect, extending its application to 
productions of affective intensity: describing the process as a kind of “fetishism” of the real, 
Rancière implies that superfluous details shore up a bourgeois and naturalised sense of reality 
beyond discourse (Rancière 2017, 6). Like the fetish – a fantastic form whose materiality is 
buoyed only by the density of relations of exchange – effects or affects are prompted by an 
excess that plugs a gap in a reality that might never have been. An affect or effect of the 
excess that anchors and limits it, reality in this sense has no point of ultimate stability or 
unity. Marking a limit (between fiction and reality), it checks movements of signification 
with non-meaning but, in reintroducing differentiation, it again admits alterity: through 
reality effects/ affects, the specific negations and wider disturbances associated with “un” can 
be identified in historical and political forms of discourse. John Frow, echoing Barthes, notes 
how the citation of specific local detail in historical writing works like the “realist novel’s 
petit fait vrai” (Frow 2006, 98).  
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Politics is also defined by something of the “un”. Discussing questions of national identity in 
an Australian context, Rancière sets out different senses of “unAustralian” where “un” 
initially signifies “the fact of being out of place, of not being entitled, of not belonging in one 
identity” (2007, 559). “UnAustralian” bifurcates as the “construction of another Australian 
identity” or “a non-identitarian unAustralianness”, distinguishing both counter-identity and 
marking “a process of dis-identification” (2007, 560). Dis-identification lies at the edge of a 
common, stably distributed – and carefully policed – order of “identities, functions and 
competencies”; it discloses a supplementary and ambivalent space, neither identified nor 
included in partisan order but nonetheless providing a site for politics: it is an “un-space” that 
is “created inside the space of the police order” (2007, 561). It enables democratic politics 
since democracy is a form of government based not on the entitlements and competence 
accorded by class, wealth, knowledge or experience but on a “radical incompetence”, an “un-
qualification”, which “gives power to a strange collection of unqualified individuals – or 
individuals without qualities” (2007, 562). Non-qualification associates democracy with “the 
people”. In Dissensus, it forms a structural “abstract supplement” underlying politics as “the 
action of supplementary subjects”: those who “have no part”, who are neither counted, 
recognised, identified or included in the distributed order of parties, are the “surplus subjects” 
who make politics happen (Rancière 2010, 33; 70). The politics of “un” emerges as the 
constitutive excess of democracy, a political form not founded on consensus or agreement of 
parties but on “un-space”, “un-qualification”, on a “part-of-no-part” where exclusion, non-
recognition, anonymity and aggregation seem to predominate.  As Rancière notes in 
Disagreement, disturbances engendered by these unidentified figures, disturbances that 
barely but significantly register their existence (still outside order and policed identity), form 
the basis of politics (1999, 123). A retrospection of an excess necessary to order and 
identification as well as the dis-identification which sets surplus and supplement in motion as 
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a political energy outside social, policed order, the role of the “un” is indeed as necessary as 
it is obscure. Invoking a political excess, unrealism disturbs not only an order of “observable 
realities” but challenges the authority of realism as that which determines what is possible, 
what is the “only thing possible” (Rancière 1999, 132).  
“Un” also impinges on the subjective dimensions of reality. In psychoanalysis, the prefix 
signifies negation: the “un” of the “unconscious” marks processes of repression and negation 
that lie beyond easy attributions of hierarchical opposition and operates as a “token” 
signalling how the unconscious has little regard for temporality or reality (Freud 1984a, 179). 
Governed by the homeostatic mechanisms of the pleasure principle, as Freud notes in his 
essay “Negation”, its distance from reality operates as a kind of unrealism – it is “unreal” – 
which furnishes a sense of psychic autonomy and acknowledges the non-objective aspect of 
the negations-repressions out of which it is formed (Freud 1984b, 439). “Reality-testing”, in 
psychic life, is not so much the adequation of inner and outer life but the re-finding of an 
object, of convincing oneself “that it is still there”: correspondence is not, it seems, a matter 
of idea and thing, but of aligning structured and subjective relations of perception, memory 
and consciousness. Negation is a significant part of the process: it attests not to the positive 
“contents” of the unconscious as a space filled with dark wishes and seething energies, but to 
the formative separation by which the unconscious is distinguished in the first place. Jacques 
Lacan’s account of the unconscious locates it amid the traces left by the effects of 
signification on the subject: negation “is not”; the unconscious is not situated in a structure of 
opposition, neither black nor white, but “un-black” – inconsistent, nothing, a barely 
discernible gap induced by the effects of signifying structure (Lacan 2002, 703). As a space 
that both assembles all the connotations of blackness and refuses them, the Freudian 
unconscious emerges as an effect of signification and suggests a different conception of the 
“unreal”: “not the imaginary that precedes the subjective realm it conditions, being in direct 
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contact with the real” (Lacan 2002, 712). Outside symbolisation, the presence and absence 
attributed to the real is not part of the organised reality of subjects and objects, but the 
registration of palpable but incomprehensible intrusions, shocks, encounters.  As Lacan 
argues, the uncanny’s  principal affective register is anxiety, the presence of some Thing that 
has not been subjected to imaginary or symbolic ordering, something not simply repressed, 
lacking or absent but incomprehensibly present (2004, 76). 
“Un” connotes a complex process of negation beyond the reaches of opposition, inversion, 
antithesis, and directly bearing on Freud’s “The Uncanny”. The latter, however, should not be 
reduced to a simplistic promotion of a romantic and positivistic unconscious or understood as 
the alternation of signifying oppositions (familiar-strange; homely-hidden) and thus barely 
distinguishable from the vacillations of “intellectual uncertainty” described by Ernst Jentsch 
(a reading which Freud vigorously rebuts): “something has to be added to what is novel and 
unfamiliar in order to make it uncanny; uncertainty is “quite irrelevant” (1990, 341; 351). In 
part shaped by the movement from primary to secondary narcissism (following Otto Rank on 
the double), the uncanny requires the individuation that comes of acculturation (and 
castration): this introduces a sense of separation and finitude into psychic reality along with 
the self-regulatory internalised law of superego. It also introduces an element of excess that 
disarms the apparent seamlessness of the transition. While the reappearance of childish or 
primitive beliefs (animism, omnipotence of thoughts, ghosts, or premature burial) offer 
illustrations of uncanny returns, the fear they evoke comes as an effect of repression:  it is “a 
matter of indifference whether what is uncanny was itself originally frightening or whether it 
carried some other affect”. Repression transforms every affect into anxiety: fright arises 
because “something repressed recurs” (1990, 363). Troubling distinctions between 
imagination and reality (“when something we have hitherto regarded as imaginary appears 
before us in reality”) cannot simply be returned to an animist time before the surmounting of 
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“primitive belief” but relates to the significations of civilised culture where a symbol is able 
“to take on the full functions of the thing it symbolizes” and thereby allow an “over-
accentuation of psychic reality in comparison with material reality” (1990, 337). The 
uncanny, then, registers the fact that neither words nor things need respect the ordered places 
given to them and discloses – in repetition and recurrence – a breach that marks both a 
disturbing negation and undoing of boundaries. Uncanny indeed.  
The uncanny’s generic ramifications lead to fairytales (and, by implication, certain types of 
fantasy) being readily discounted by Freud. As wish-fulfilments, they lack that additional 
element necessary to evoke uncanny sensations (1990, 368). Comfortably and generically 
cordoned off, they do not impinge on the reader’s sense of reality. Evoking neither hesitation 
nor even uncertainty, they manifest the simple escapism of wish-fulfilment. Jackson, too, 
dismisses Victorian fairy fantasies as exhibiting only an attraction to the “‘zero’ point of 
indifferentiation and inorganicism”, eschewing any of the interrogative or disturbing features 
crucial to her version of the fantastic (1981, 141). Roger Caillois’ Anthology of the Fantastic 
offers a stronger distinction: “fairytale is a marvellous universe opposed to the real world 
without destroying its coherence. The fantastic, on the contrary, manifests a scandal, a 
shredding, a bizarre irruption, almost unbearable to the real world” (1966, 8). In contrast, 
Tzvetan Todorov’s The Fantastic (1975) links uncanny and fantasy (he calls it the 
marvellous) in a system that is explicitly structuralist in the manner it isolates genre from 
social reality: any hesitation prompted by the fantastic remains a generic category. Hence, 
minimising interactions between imaginary and real modes, it leaves little room for 
disturbing – and unreal – effects or affects. The strangeness of the uncanny, however, finds a 
perceptual and formal correlate in “defamiliarisation”. Viktor Shklovsky identifies the 
habitual and hackneyed modes that lead to routine and formulaic presentations and proposes 
difficult and strange employments of poetic images to disrupt hackneyed and generic 
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composition. Unfamiliar images and metaphors not only break up aesthetic habits, they serve 
to refresh the perception of things, developing forms of writing that allow reality to be seen 
anew (1988,  20). The political implications of defamiliarisation – as alienation effects – 
shape the “cognitive estrangement” examined in Darko Suvin’s (1979) examination of 
science fiction. They also inform the discontinuities and collisions employed in in Harrison’s 
reworking of generic effects (Harrison 2005a, 151). 
Remaining negative and interrogative, unrealism does not resolve in a single theoretical 
frame. It is the opposite of the habit of “unseeing” dramatized in The City and the City 
(2009). Set in the heterotopia of a divided and doubled city, the neo-noir novel details the 
linguistic, ethnic, historical and political identities of two dis-similar worlds living apart 
culturally and materially yet in close geographical proximity – in adjoining neighbourhoods, 
for instance. Borders overlap: material and imaginary, they sustain no congruent relation: an 
official city map shades areas of “total”, “alter” and “crosshatched” space (Miéville 2009, 
56).  From Copula Hall one can leave Beszel and enter Ul Qoma by the street from which one 
exited. A tourist or businessperson in “another country” may walk a road never before visited 
that “shared the latitude-longitude of their own address” and view architecture that previously 
remained unseen, even passing an old woman “sitting next to and a whole city away from 
their own building” (2009, 86). Proximity and almost absolute strangeness: an unthinkable 
relation of bodies and cultures living in physically, legally and psychologically the same-
other space. In the two-cities-as-not-as-one, life is lived, as it were, on different sides of a 
transparent Mőbius strip. But such is the weight of the unacknowledged co-presence linking 
cultures and spaces that the disavowal founding their difference assumes an equivalent, 
ubiquitous and unrelenting force. “Breach” names the horror of transgression and the 
elaborate legal and repressive agencies that effectively and almost magically enforce the 
slightest incursion of borders, even the most innocent or accidental. Breach, however, implies 
16 
 
more than external measures of policing and control: self-discipline is expected from an early 
age, a discipline honed to an automatic level of almost immediate neurological response and 
perceptual near-blindness. “Unseeing”, no matter how naturalised it has become for the 
inhabitants of both cities as a kind of ingrained cultural blanking, remains a learned and much 
practiced act, one charged with memories of censure and apprehensions of stern reprimand. It 
is not easy to walk through crosshatched areas without seeing half of the buildings one passes 
by or not seeing many of the bodies moving on the same pavements: “In Beszel, it was a 
quiet area, but the streets were crowded with those elsewhere. I unsaw them, but it took time 
to pick past them all” (2009, 31). Unseeing registers the sensation of another presence before 
an active refusal to take cognizance of their existence is allowed into play. So naturalised is 
the practice of unseeing that it only becomes apparent in moments when it fails. In the other 
city, one figure catches glimpses of un-familiar buildings: “not that I saw them – I unsaw 
carefully, but they registered a little, illicitly” (2009, 54). In official governmental cross-
border committees, moreover, seeing those from the other place does not entail a simple 
lifting of prohibitions. Looking – drawing out the diverse negations involved – becomes 
stranger still: permitted to acknowledge his counterparts one detective comments that it “was 
strange not to unsee these people in formal Ul Qoma dress” (2009, 72). “Not to unsee” is odd, 
marked as doubly negative: perception does not, even with the removal of cultural restraints, 
revert to a seemingly natural or positive order of vision. Pressures underpinning familiar 
norms and practices bound up in unseeing (and, of course, seeing) undermine any idea of 
natural perception. Unseeing after all – in disclosing and denaturing the forces structuring 
sense – pertains to unrealism, but in inverted (negative) form: where it describes the 
habituated perceptual procedures aimed at rapidly closing off the registration of something 
other in the name and interests of carefully policed ideological reality, unrealism’s 
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interrogation pokes at the fractures of any self-enclosed and naturalised system of perception, 
disclosing, perhaps, the possibility of something other.  
 
Critical Unrealism 
Michael Lőwy’s notion of “critical irrealism” emerges – across literary forms and cultural 
contexts – as a way of interrogating generic and political realities: non-realist –  gothic, 
fairytale, utopian – works of art offer their social critique by neither attempting to represent 
life as it really is nor by presupposing an objective reality external to subjective and symbolic 
structures (Lőwy 2007, 193-4). Traversing borders and eschewing the assumed fixity of 
reality, works of “critical irrealism” can offer an “implicit negative critique” that highlights 
issues of their historical present. Lőwy, however, ultimately underplays critical irrealism’s 
political significance as “simply a different form of literature and art” (2007, 204-5). The 
approach need not, however, be restricted to formal interventions. Indeed, the Warwick 
Research Collective has taken critical irrealism in explicitly political directions to argue that 
various global literary forms disclose the “combined and uneven” tendencies of economic 
domination: irrealism, linking imaginary and factual modes, is better equipped to address 
capitalism’s conjunctions of “abstract” and “scarring” interventions in social realities (WRec 
2015, 70). Phantasmagorical fictional forms offer more effective renditions of the violent, 
destabilising or horrifying effects of capital as it instantiates itself – medially, spectrally, 
globally and unevenly – in ways beyond the grasp of any single or realist frame (74). Critical 
irrealism attempts to give form to forces that are difficult to grasp, a “spectral mapping” of 
obscure and abstract formations of global power. In contrast, unrealism aims, less 
ambitiously perhaps, at stripping away the bases of credulity, disrupting the habits of 
perception and regulation through which such real phantasms are sustained.  
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The unrealism of Harrison’s fiction refracts politics through generic reflexivity and 
juxtaposition. The fiction produced from the 1980s tenders direct criticism of the right-wing 
economic and social transformations that instantiate the fantastically real and horrifying 
country called “Thatcherland” (Harrison 2005a, 152). Formal strategies of the writing, too, 
interrogate processes binding particular perceptual coordinates to an increasingly naturalised 
(from Thatcher to Blair) political fantasy. Realistic modes and effects figure strongly in the 
critical process.  Climbers (1991) is a novel attending carefully to the actuality of 
geographical place and topographies of geological formation: it names familiar northern 
English towns, villages and roads to enhance its detailed descriptions of crags, moors and 
types of rock. An element of participatory documentary ethnography informs the depictions 
of the working-class northern men who spend much of their free time climbing. Aspects of 
social realism loom large in accounts of declining industrial communities, riven with 
unemployment and grim small towns with run-down high streets, boarded-up shops, greasy-
spoon cafes and shabby public houses. Beauty spots and parking lots are strewn with 
industrial and consumer waste. Yet, glossy magazine idealisations of climbing readily 
disdained, there is something of the real that accompanies and transforms the experience of 
cold, wet and uninspiring climbs: it is not just threats of pain, injury or even risk of death that 
confer a heightened experience associated with the real, but a feeling of sovereign intensity 
and meaning lying beyond ordinary reality. Throughout the novel more and less than realist 
moments interrupt the picture: tales of feral children – escapees from urban school day-trips – 
are said to be living on the Moors and feeding on stray ramblers and lost boy scouts; 
speculations on the possibility of double vision in moving InterCity train carriages; 
reflections on the transformations of reality effected by light. Mundane worlds are 
unfamiliarised so that other energies and forces can become apparent. 
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Generic juxtaposition has weirder effects in other stories where reality is fractured by 
historical, geo-seismic, mystical and political forces. “Running Down” (1975), set amid the 
rural Lake District beauty of the Langdale Pikes situates a reunion of school acquaintances 
alongside eruptions of strange telekinetic powers: the ending contrasts an unexplained 
cataclysm – cliffs collapsing into mountain tarns with an unworldly, phantasmagorical force 
worthy of Poe – with a not-quite counterfactual history in which social and political unrest 
provides the conditions for a fascist government in Britain (Harrison 2004, 23-54). Less 
dramatic, but equally unnerving in its juxtaposition of familiar urban banality and gently 
underexplored psychological disturbance, is the story “Egnaro” (1981): set in Manchester 
before the consumer boom of the 1980s had reconstructed back-street bookshops, chop 
houses and bars, the story details the quietly disturbing effects of a mythical utopia of desire 
that, when encountered in whispered conversations, advertising, books, hoardings, television,  
derails any sense of security or anchorage in daily life: “it does not exist: yet it is quite real” 
(Harrison 2004, 114). Intimations of something else unsettle and confound, leading the story 
to propose a doubleness to reality that hinges upon a “dead point” in which the mysteries of 
some other world meet the dull contours of ordinariness. The uneasy interrelation is enacted 
in other fictions: “The Course of the Heart” (1992) relates the lasting psycho-mystical effects 
of an arcane ritual undertaken by three college friends. A quest romance is invented to 
provide emotional consolation for the protagonists discombobulated by a weird paganism 
echoing Arthur Machen’s stories (some fragments were published in short story form under 
the title “Great God Pan” [1988]). Otherworldly figures appear in the most mundane places: 
two grey, larval human shapes writhe together in the small stony backyard of a terraced 
cottage or intertwine in the screen of a hospital ward’s television tuned to a daytime soap 
opera (Harrison 2005b, 171). The novella ends in the ecstasy of mystical fullness, with the 
fire and roses of a visitant “pleroma” played out over the dark, stone houses of a remote 
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Yorkshire market town. In “Signs of Life” (1997), the vivid bustle and brashness of an 
entrepreneurial and consumerist London (branded suits, flash cars, expensive restaurants and 
very dubious but highly lucrative business opportunities) are played out alongside the story of 
a woman who dreams of flight in an echo of Angela Carter’s feminist magical realism: the 
metaphor of fulfilling one’s potential, living the dream or achieving one’s ambition is now 
realised by venture capital, corporate marketing and emerging biotech industries. Her painful, 
expensive experimental genetic therapies, however, do not really make the grade: though she 
comes to look like an exotic bird, she remains unable to fly.  
Harrison’s science fiction, too, interrogates generic, scientific and ideological formations of 
reality: the Light trilogy combines a space operatic drama of multi-dimensional alien vessels 
and planet-moving technology with a down-at-heel urban cyberpunk aesthetic of erotic and 
psycho-technologies, literally immersive media (“twink-tanks”) and sentient tattoos. The 
expansiveness of one mode and the implosion of another remains calibrated to the changing 
political realities of their time of production: plots defer to an early twenty-first century in 
which technoscience and mathematical theory has irrevocably instantiated a quantum 
reconfiguration of all the components of physical reality; neoliberal economics has 
deregulated every sphere of human life; and postmodern aesthetics has thrown meanings, 
identities and values to the cosmic winds. While material existence might have become 
multiple and meaningless, however, the political consequences of its derealisation remain at 
issue, a question of unreality as much as reality. 
For all the generic juxtapositions of Harrison’s fiction, one mode is placed – through 
exclusion – under critical scrutiny: fantasy. In an interview with Mark Bould, he cites 
Climbers to illustrate his practice of writing “fantasy without any fantasy in it” and sketches a 
critique of genres that produce a “constructed world, virtual worlds”. The criticism does not 
exclude all types of fantasy, only a specific mode. Climbers is both “completely real” and “a 
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complete fantasy world”, but it is one in which consequences of writing, position and actions 
are made evident even as its main protagonists seek something beyond the “ordinary, 
quotidian sort of life” (Bould 2005, 328). “Fantasy without fantasy” is not therefore a simple 
privileging of realism, whether generic or social, nor does it assume a reality purged of any 
fantastic or ideological dimension. It simply refuses any distinction that (as in Todorovian 
structuralism) differentiates genres without tracking the relations between them and their 
conditions of production. Fantasies of a cultural and political kind, Harrison notes in the same 
interview, are interrogated in stories like “Egnaro”, concerned at the way human desire is 
“hijacked by advertising”, by consumer fantasies promising and disappointing gratification. 
Significantly, Harrison employs a familiar trope of fantasy fiction to describe the process: 
“advertising offers a trip through a portal which is closed the moment you buy the product” 
(Bould 2005, 330). Life is not of course magically transformed by the purchase, nor is desire 
satisfied. 
Fantasy, both as genre and as a commercial-ideological form, feeds and feeds on a particular 
type of reality. Redirecting and framing desire according to consumerist imperatives, it both 
abstracts from and returns to a familiar world, its things circumscribed by the fantastic form 
of the commodity. Defending the study of fantasy fiction against Marxist suspicions of the 
anti-historical tendencies of the genre, Miéville neatly observes that, since capitalism is 
experienced in terms of the fantastic form of the commodity, contemporary reality already “is 
a fantasy” (2002, 42). The fantastic structures articulating desire and reality are not the sole 
prerogative of fantasy genres. Romance operates in a similar manner. Northrop Frye’s 
discussion of romance (of which fantasy is a subset) as both a “structural core” and a site of 
“shared allusions” wherein culture affirms and reinforces its origins, identities and myths 
establishes a fantasy frame which inscribes reality with specific meanings: it gives, so 
Jameson observes, an ideological form to the world (Jameson 1975, 142). The ideological 
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implications of fictional fantasy have been tracked in Janice Radway’s study of romance 
reading among twentieth-century US female audiences. It locates popular fiction’s 
articulations of desire, fantasy and reality in a broader ideological frame. In contrast to the 
stories, romance reading is “fuelled by dissatisfaction and disaffection”: rather than “perfect 
contentment” in which the “incongruence” of domestic experience and patriarchal ideology is 
resolved in narratives, the position of reading is sustained in a tense and incomplete dialectic 
of desiring. The imbalance of an actual “longing” generated by marriage’s failure to live up 
to its ideological billing is tapped as a resource: “yearning” – targeted by “vicarious” fictional 
resolutions – turns the discrepancy between reality and fantasy into market opportunity 
(Radway 1984, 68). Romance fiction thus turns on desire: exploiting and purging actual 
discontent, it serves to “recontain” unruly feelings with narrative outlets that are “never”, 
Radway notes, “wholly successful”, leaving room for the cycle of desire, dissatisfaction and 
exploitation to continue. Romances engender “a fantasy that vicariously supplies the pleasure 
and attention they need” and “staves off the necessity of presenting these needs as demands 
in the real world” (1984, 217). Like the advertising that co-opts and disarms human desire in 
Harrison’s “Egnaro”, the link between generic fantasy and consumerist (fantasy-generating) 
reality manifests a circuit synchronised to the movements of desire in capitalism: born of real 
dissatisfaction, desire is given a frame in which it is both source of and bond to a cycle of 
commodification, both the cause and site of market opportunities and dis-satisfactions. 
Fantasy and reality; fantasy and realism: a curious doubling marks an overlap of generic and 
social realities in which fantasy stems from and fills in deficiencies in reality and realism and 
offers a reassertion of difference wherein fantasy enables a continued stimulation and 
exploitation of desiring due to the same dissatisfactions of the real.  
 
A-politics? 
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In upsetting the articulation and containment of human desiring in a single ideological frame 
and in fracturing naturalised generic structures of presentation and ideologically-habituated 
modes of perception, unrealism manifests political implications. But, evacuating grounds of 
unified authority, it is tied to no single political position. Kazuo Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go 
(2005) follows the critical trajectory of unrealism devoid of, it seems, any explicit agenda. 
Reviewing the novel, Harrison dismisses its generic aspirations and raises significant 
concerns about its politics. Occupying what he describes as a “pure rhetorical space”, he 
regards its commitment to understatement and clever humanism to be an avoidance of 
contemporary questions of class division and power (Harrison 2005c, 26). The apolitical 
space of the novel reflects the apathy of its protagonists. But it also prompts a strong response 
implying political and not just aesthetic disappointment: Harrison, closing with a focus on the 
novel’s sense of pervasive personal frustration, despair, anger and failure to explode, suggests 
a powerful, if unstated, political reading. 
Never Let Me Go’s patterns of negativity and unrealism are deceptive, but they may be all the 
more effective as a result: while it seems to offer grist to any number of critical readings 
wanting to mill its narrative affirmatively, the historical unspace on which it establishes itself 
ultimately disallows any readymade positive interpretation. Raising questions of genre, the 
novel is variously categorised as SF, dystopian, posthuman, sentimental, gothic, a boarding 
school tale, a bildungsroman or a realist fiction (see Shaddox; Currie; Byron and Ogstron, 
Wasson). Amenable to diverse genre readings, the form never quite settles. A novel 
populated by clones, it has none of the obvious trappings of SF, fantasy or horror. 
Structurally, it moves back and forth between figures of self and other, human and clone, 
monster and mechanism, without being able to maintain a single position: readers are 
“perplexed” and “implicated” (Toker and Cherthoff 2008, 177). With whom, what or where, 
does the reader identify: with narrating clone or with a barely visible humanity associated 
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with indifference and monstrous cruelty? Readers are made to “probe the essence and limits 
of humanity” while the banality of narration juxtaposed with undescribed medical horrors 
prompts outrage at inhumanity, complicity and political passivity (Martin Puchner, 36; 
Harrison 2005c, 26; Robbins). Yet any secure position for judgement, critique, and 
condemnation is undone, as are habituated and humanising patterns of fictional identification 
(Fluet, 285; Black, 785-6). There is no difference – biologically – between humans and 
clones. Differences are rendered inconsequential amid familiar settings, language and 
experiences. The effect, however, is not based on an uncanny vacillation, but in abjection. In 
the world of the novel only abjection – conjoining superseded nature with super-egoic culture 
– maintains any affectively direct and unequivocal demarcation: compared to the revulsion of 
arachnophobia, human attitudes to clones – even in the most sympathetic of settings – 
register an evident and immediate disgust. Clones, too, recognise the looks that set them 
apart, even though they do not seem to apprehend fully their significance (that their condition 
is utterly irrevocable, their plight hopeless from the start). To imagine an alternative future, or 
even a “deferral” (postponing organ harvesting if a clone couple is in love) is simply 
window-dressing: some clones enjoy small advantages and distinction, those from Hailsham 
are shielded from the horrors that, in other facilities, accompany their kind being “reared in 
deplorable conditions” (Ishiguro 2005, 253-55). Yet Hailsham’s pioneering of a “more 
humane and better way of doing things” is a vain liberal veneer to common industrial-scale 
practices of rearing the bearers of replacement organs in “vast government homes” (Ishiguro 
2005, 260). Taking the medical benefits of enforced, factory-farming and organ harvesting 
for granted, humans no longer care where the organs come from: they have no wish at all to 
be reminded that replacement organs (like the meat on today’s plates) are excised from a 
living, feeling, fellow creature. Abjection, in this context, polices economic interests and 
maintains a general indifference to the exploitation of clones.  
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Liberal and humane treatment of clones, if it has minimal functional value (they are docile 
enough from the start), does engender disappointment and, even for carefully cocooned 
clones, produces a stunning level of misapprehension regarding their own condition. A trip to 
a small town in search of a “possible” (a genetic match in the human world that fuels clone 
fantasies of a different existence) provokes – quite late in the novel – the first open, indignant 
acknowledgement of their actual status: they are “junk”, who should be looking – not in 
offices and galleries for genetic originals – but among a degraded layer of society 
(prostitutes, beggars, addicts) (Ishiguro 2005, 164). While the assessment of their abject 
status is broadly correct, it remains too humanised, too much an effect of the institutional 
values they have internalised: identification with figures of a human underclass 
misrecognises the economics of class and power involved in cloning. Only a wealthier class 
could afford to maintain a cloned body of spare parts. Their initial – if misguided – search 
was in the correct location: a “possible” would indeed be found in an art gallery rather than a 
back street. Nonetheless, the misrecognition that their actual status lies outside of any human 
orbit, below even the lowest class of humans, emphasises how their abjection is even more 
terrible than they can envisage: sampled from the genes of a richer class they are – as 
manufactured carriers of replacement body parts – even less human than the most abject 
examples of humanity they can imagine. 
The intensity and ubiquity of the abjection underlying the world in which the clones placidly 
go about their business makes accounting for differentiations of self-other, human-monster 
more of a problem. While evoking misidentifications and reversals to prompt a negative 
sense of, and critical debates about, humanity, the novel’s world suggests that things are 
much worse. Humanity, whether embodied or as ideal, is barely in the picture or at stake in 
the world of the novel: its avatars – and only in the most residual and misapprehended 
fashion – are the clones themselves. Occasioned by misrecognitions of speech, setting, genre 
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and history, the reader is set up as a dupe of the novel’s unfamiliarising technique and its 
impossible narration. Never Let Me Go is narrated by a clone and addressed to clones: “I 
don’t know what it was like where you were, but at Hailsham…”, so “Kathy H.” begins 
(Ishiguro 2005, 3). Her assumption is that her audience is made up of clones, though raised in 
less salubrious institutions. While a lack of specificity allows misreading (her story could be 
about growing up in a boarding school, a care home, a juvenile detention centre), unfamiliar 
technical language (“carer”, “guardian”, “donor”, “donation”, “possible”) performs a 
particular estrangement. It prepares the registration of a very different order of existence. As 
a clone speaking to other clones, Kathy, in the terms of the novel, acknowledges an almost 
complete exclusion from the human world of hospitals, motorways, service stations, tower 
blocks, cafés and stores where she works, drives, lives and occasionally shops. Like other 
clones, she shows little interest in a life outside, sharing the indifference manifested by clones 
towards the human world: we “didn’t think much about our lives beyond” or “how they fitted 
into the larger world” (Ishiguro 2005, 114). Clone and human existence overlap and yet 
barely come into contact: the former, though allowed out, remain – apparently willingly – 
relegated securely to the “shadows” of daily life (2005, 259). Kathy’s language also shares 
the very limited horizons of a clone’s existence and lifespan. Oddly self-satisfied, her account 
is quick to document her professional and material success despite its obvious limitations. 
The manner in which she speaks, too, registers little emotion: given her situation, she 
maintains striking equanimity, her speech full of banalities and commonplaces. She reveals 
“no hidden depth”, manifesting a “flatness” of character and language (Puchner, 34-5). Her 
narrative, spoken in “stilted circumlocutions”, encodes “failures to imagine a different 
reality” (Mullan, 106; 108). Its temporality, too, renders it difficult to locate: the telling of the 
story positions itself between different stages of narrative recall, not just between an event 
and its narration but amid various intermediate levels of relation, recollections of acts of 
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recollection. The overlayering also affects the future as well as the past (Currie, 95-6). 
Constantly requiring the affirmation of others in the same position, the narrative seems to 
lose its own grounding, dependent on the memories of others. The sense of shock they feel 
when they hear that the place that meant so much to them – Hailsham – has closed is no 
surprise: without the security of this remembered place, the clones are described as a bunch 
of balloons released from the grip of a clown (Ishiguro 2005, 209). From the start, the solidity 
of place and memory is unclear: Kathy readily describes her institutionalised childhood to a 
donor so that he can absorb them as his own, preferable to his actual memories and past 
(Ishiguro 2005, 3). In the story, the sight, for one human, of a young clone clutching a pillow 
and miming to a sentimental song called “Never Let Me go”, evokes not sympathetic 
identification but a (selfish, human) mourning for lost future, for the lost possibility of a 
kinder more humane world.  
The narration – a clone speaking to other clones – seems to loosen its own grasp on present, 
past and future. Its excavation of its own reality is further undermined by the setting: a 
sparseness of detail and scantiness of description (other than coastal towns, motorways, car-
parks, fields, hospitals and care centres), leave room for suggestion and misrecognition: like 
the “timelessness” of the dating there is little historically locative detail (Currie, 93). The 
dating, too, is significant: announced as “England, late 1990s”, the novel was first published 
in 2005. Set in the proximate past, the un-familiar world of the novel not only opens up 
questions of what might be expected in the future (what might happen given widespread use 
of cloning technologies) but excavates any grounding in historical realism or stable present. 
A temporal fissure discloses an entirely other past: if the clones are in their thirties, the 
invisible – or initially non-apparent – social, scientific and political institutions necessary to 
their production and use have been in place for most of the post-WWII period. The ‘now’ of 
the narrative defines itself by means of an impossible ‘then’, placing any assumption of 
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actual and accepted cultural-historical knowledge at odds with the narrative’s counterfactual 
tale. In the novel, the practice of cloning for organ donation has been in operation for at least 
a generation (since the 1970s) and on a national scale: there are “homes” all over the country; 
an infrastructure of care centres (sometimes in old holiday camps) and support workers; 
policies have been developed, publically debated and changed over the period according to 
shifts in political and popular mood and ethical breaches in research (the creation of 
superhumans); the treatment of clones has been liberalised and hardened according to swings 
of opinion driven by self-interest, social concern and species fears (Ishiguro 2005, 254-6). 
While this England looks the same, it is another country, familiar but entirely alien at the 
same time. No humanity, no history, no common culture: all frames and grounds for reading 
are dismantled. The narrative’s no-time and no-place is compounded by its no-genre: any 
realism of address, setting and character is imaginary; any science fiction turns into science 
history; any dystopianism becomes retroactive and any horror is unregistered or disavowed. 
Unrealism comes to the fore: recognisable patterns empty themselves out in an extensive 
undermining of pasts, presents, futures; horizons close, leaving no possible position either for 
narration or reading to secure itself, no anchors, no realities, only an unfamiliarising and 
blank negation in which projections see themselves flicker and fade. A text of apparent 
realism and complete unrealism at once, it is also a fiction that may offer an unnerving 
heritage history of an already-cloned present. But that would be another story. 
 
Fred Botting is Professor of English Literature at Kingston University, London. He has 
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